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The technological obstructions of asylum 
Asylum seekers as forced techno-users and governing through disorientation 
January 7, 2019, Greek island of Lesvos: UNHCR’s officers were walking tent by tent in the hot-
spot of Moria to do the monthly verification with the asylum seekers who are eligible for the Cash 
Assistance Programme. According to UNHCR, the Programme “restores  dignity  and  empowers 
asylum seekers  and  refugees” . At that time, around 7000 women, men and children were living in 1
the crowded hotspot: “we have no hot water, and some areas of the camp there is no electricity 
either. We are all becoming mad, some of us have been stranded here for one year or more”, an Ira-
nian man told me outside of the camp. “Now I have to go back to my tent” he added “as the UN-
HCR is coming to top up my card, they informed me this morning with a text; I hope to be still eli-
gible. It is very difficult to understand how these technologies work”. This snapshot from Lesvos, 
where asylum seekers  are given prepaid cards by humanitarian actors while they are exposed to 2
protracted precarity is iconic of “techno-humanitarianism” (Morozov, 2012). This paper focuses on 
the Greek asylum system and investigates how asylum seekers are turned into forced hindered 
techno-users, whose access to protection, rights and financial-humanitarian support is obstructed 
and mediated by different technologies and apps – such as Skype, Viber and Whatsapp.  The article 
shows that asylum seekers as  obstructed forced techno-users  are expected to act responsibly while 
at the same time are kept in a protracted state of dependency on humanitarian actors and are re-
peatedly disoriented.  
The Greek refugee system is a case in point for scrutinizing the technological obstructions of 
asylum: indeed, asylum seekers need to navigate a series of technological mediations for interacting 
with both Greek authorities as well as with humanitarian actors  and  “are confronted with multiple 3
technological steps that hamper them from accessing rights. .The article mobilises a transversal ap-
proach to techno-humanitarianism and refugee governmentality, building on critical security stud-
http://estia.unhcr.gr/en/greece-cash-assistance-february-2019/ 1
 Throughout the paper, I use the term "asylum seekers” any time that I refer to migrants who intend to claim asylum or who 2
have lodged their asylum application and who, therefore, are controlled and managed by humanitarian and whose legal and 
spatial restrictions depend on asylum policies. I use the term “migrant” to refer to people who have not (yet) lodged their asy-
lum application.
 As I will illustrate more in detail later in the paper, in order to apply for asylum, they need to pre-book an appointment 3
with the Greek Asylum Office via Skype.
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ies, migration scholarship and critical works on humanitarianism. A growing scholarship has stud-
ied the transformations that occurred in refugee governmentality due to the  use of digital technolo-
gies (Jacosben, 2015; Jacobsen, Sandvik, 2018; Read et al. 2016; Sandvik et al. 2014) and big data 
(Amoore, 2020; Metcalfe  Dencik, 2019) leading some authors to investigate the technologisation 
of the humanitarian space (Abdelnour, Saeed, 2014) and to caution against the emphasis on techno-
innovation (Scott-Smith, 2016). Here I shift the focus from surveillance and control towards an ana-
lysis of how the forced technological intermediations in refugee camps further obstruct asylum 
seekers’ access to rights and financial-humanitarian support. Drawing on the assumption that tech-
nology “loops back in the constitution of social order” (Jacobsen, 2015: 148) and “is co-constitutive 
of the humanitarian environment it seeks to capture” (Read et al. 2016: 7), the piece takes into  ac-
count the forced encounters between asylum seekers and technologies, and it advances a twofold 
argument. 
First, it contends that asylum seekers are turned into forced hindered techno-users who are governed 
by being disoriented: indeed, they need to keep themselves up to date regarding the frequent 
changes about eligibility criteria, technological steps to take and deadlines to comply with. Second, 
and relatedly, the article argues that the analytics of securitisation and victimisation are not exhaus-
tive for grasping how asylum seekers as techno-users are shaped and disciplined. In fact, people 
who seek asylum are certainly represented and treated also as  risky subjects and as subjects of pity 
(Newman, van Selm, 2003).  Yet, an insight into the technological obstructions of asylum highlights 
that asylum seekers are expected to act as responsible techno-users and comply with a series of 
techno-bureaucratic steps while at the same time their dependency on humanitarian actors is reiter-
ated. 
Digital technologies, it has been argued by scholars, work as mediations tools which are both tacti-
cally used by migrants to make their own way, and enforced by state authorities to spot, identify and 
control migrants (Nedelcu, Soysuren, 2020). Yet, here I speak of forced technological mediation to 
draw attention to the asymmetrical power relations between humanitarian and state actors on the 
one side, and asylum seekers who are requested or pushed to use technologies on the other. By 
speaking of forced technological mediations I insist on how these multiplicities of technologies con-
tribute to obstruct migrants’ access to asylum. In fact, while in critical security studies scholars have 
widely analysed how digital technologies are used for tracking and controlling refugees, here I in-
vestigate how the incorporation of technologies in refugee governmentality contribute to hinder 
asylum seekers and, thus, render them more precarious. 
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Methodologically, this paper builds on empirical material collected during my research fieldwork in 
Greece, in Athens and Lesvos, between 2017 and 2020  and on the analysis of UNHCR public doc4 -
uments. During the fieldwork I interviewed Greek institutions (the Asylum Service and the Ministry 
of Migration), international organisations (UNHCR in Athens and Lesvos, IOM and the Red Cross), 
international and Greek NGOs (Doctors without Borders, Caritas, Pikpa) and the financial provider 
of the Cash Assistance Programme, Prepaid Financial Services, which is based in London. During 
my participatory observation, I interviewed asylum seekers outside the hotspot of Moria in Lesvos 
and in the city of Mitilini, as well as in Athens, during the card distribution process at Caritas office 
and in the camp of Eleonas . Drawing on such empirical material, the paper proceeds by analysing 5
digital and financial tools in relation to the restructuring of the asylum regime, conceived as a polit-
ical technology for containing, disrupting and controlling migration (De Genova, 2013; Karakayali, 
Rigo, 2010). As part of that, it is important to stress that the hotspots, which are located on five 
Greek islands , have become “cramped spaces” (Walters, Luthi, 2016) where asylum seekers are 6
protractedly stranded. This is mainly the result of the geographical restrictions that had been en-
forced through the EU-Turkey Deal, which establishes that migrants who land on the Greek islands 
need to wait there until when their asylum claim is processed (Spathopoulou, Carasthathis, 2020). 
“Humanitarian triage therefore provides basic needs to a captive population” (Pallister-Wilkins, 
2016), as long as migrants are entrapped twice there - in the hotspots and on the islands.  
The paper proceeds in three sections. It starts by discussing the multiple technological intermedia-
tions that asylum seekers are confronted with, focusing on the Cash Assistance Programme and on 
how asylum seekers are obstructed in accessing asylum and financial support. It explores the wide-
spread disorientation that asylum seekers experience, as long as they need to navigate un-legible 
techno-scripts that change over time. The paper moves on by critically engaging with the literature 
on securitisation and victimisation of refugees, and it argues that   asylum seekers are not treated 
exclusively as potential threats or as victims but also as forced hindered subjects; that is, they are 
kept in a condition of protracted uncertainty and, in meanwhile, they need to find out the multiple 
 I conducted interviews with all actors involved in the Cash Assistance Programme, which include the UNHCR, the 4
NGOs Catholic Relief Services, Caritas and the Hellenic Red Cross, and the Prepaid Financial Services. I have also 
conducted interviews with the Greek Asylum service in Athens. Plus, while I was doing participatory observation in 
Lesvos and in Athens, I have interviewed asylum seekers. In 2020, due to Covid-19, I conducted few interviews over 
Skype (with Caritas Greece and with PFS).
 I got the authorisation to access refugee camps from the Ministry of Interior.5
 Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos.6
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technological and bureaucratic steps they are requested to comply with. In the final section, the arti-
cle illustrates how forced technological mediations actually reinforce asylum seekers’ dependence 
on humanitarian actors and enhance socio-legal precarity. The article contributes to the debates on 
securitization and victimization of refugees and asylum seekers, highlighting how asylum seekers 
are not exclusively criminalised and controlled or protected; rather, they are also turned into forced 
hindered techno-users and are governed through disorientation. The forced technological media-
tions reinforce asylum seekers’ protracted dependency on humanitarian actors while at the same 
time they are expected to act as responsible techno-users. Thus, the article argues, a critical en-
gagement with techno-humanitarianism involves interrogating the processes of subjectivation that 
are play (Foucault, 1988). By subjectivation I refer here on the one hand to the humanitarian narra-
tives around refugees’ autonomy through technology and on the other to the ways in which 
refugees’ subjectivities are expected to act as responsible consumers and techno-users from within a 
condition of spatial containment. 
Cash assistance and disruptive technologies:  
Greece is the first European country with a EU-funded Cash Assistance Programme for asylum 
seekers. The Programme was launched in 2016  and then implemented in 2017, as a response to the 7
so called “refugee crisis”. On paper, all asylum seekers who arrived in the country after January 
2015 and who hold the asylum card, are eligible for the financial support: this is uploaded every 
month on a Mastercard sponsored prepaid card and can be used both to pay in shops and to take 
cash from ATM machines . However, spatial and mobility restrictions apply, similarly to other con8 -
texts where cash assistance programmes had been implemented (Coddington, 2019): only asylum 
seekers who accept to stay in the accommodations provided by the Greek authorities or by UNHCR 
could benefit of the Cash Assistance Programme, although, paradoxically, this had been set as a 
way for improving refugees' autonomy . The Programme is run by UNHCR, which is in charge of 9
collecting the data from the card beneficiaries, in cooperation with two Greek NGOs  that are in10 -
 The Cash Assistance scheme in Greece is part of the ESTIA Programme, funded by the  European Commission.7
 The monthly financial support for each individual is of 90 euros, if they stay in a hosting centre in which food is pro8 -
vided, of 150 euros, if they do not receive food in camps. The amount changes for families, and it depends on the num-
ber of family members. 
 Yet, in response to asylum seekers’ struggles that took place between 2017 and 2018, in 2019 the UNHCR broadened 9
the criteria of the Cash Assistance Programme. As a result of that, even asylum seekers who live independently and who 
can provide an official rent contract or even a self-declaration of their rent can access the Programme.
 The Hellenic Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services. This latter has subcontracted the job to Caritas Hellas.10
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volved in the card registration and in the monthly verification process on the mainland. The Cash 
Assistance Programme in Greece is not a state-driven project; on the contrary, it constitutes a case 
in point of “internal externalisation” (Heller, Pezzani, 2016). Indeed, even if the Greek authorities 
have endorsed it, they are not directly involved in the Programme, which is in fact funded by the 
EU, managed by UNHCR and supported by a financial provider based in London, Prepaid Financial 
Services. 
The Greek refugees’ context is an interesting laboratory of  experimentation of EU migration and 
refugee policies , and yet, this is not because of advanced technologies.  Rather, its salience and 11
specificity depends on  the mix of widely promoted technologies - such as the prepaid cards - and 
more ordinary ones - such as Skype, Viber and Whatsapp. In fact, even the apps that refugees wide-
ly use in their daily life - like WhatsApp - might turn out into obstacles to asylum seekers, when 
these are used as compulsory technological mediations to claim asylum and to receive financial 
support. For this reason, I suggest, it is key to analyse the prepaid cards that asylum seekers receive 
in relation to the apps that that mediate the interactions between asylum seekers and humanitarian 
actors. The scholarship on cashless programmes focuses on the relationship between migrants, fi-
nancial tools (debit cards) and humanitarian actors, and points to the forms of discrimination and 
surveillance that are enacted through these programmes (Jacobsen, Fast, 2020; Tazzioli, 2019; Ul-
rich, Lambert, 2018a). 
By arguing that asylum seekers are turned into forced hindered techno-users I echo works that stress 
how cashless technologies increase asylum seeker’s dependency on the state and on humanitarian 
actors (Coddington et al. 2020; Jacobsen, 2017). Indeed, as I will illustrate in detail later, far from 
being empowered through technology and prepaid cards, asylum seekers' dependency on humani-
tarian actors is enhanced. As part of this literature, scholars have highlighted the destitution effects 
associated to the implementation of cashless programmes. Kate Coddington has importantly shown 
how the use of cashless technologies constitutes a form of slow violence towards asylum seekers: 
indeed, according to Coddington, cash assistance programmes are part of broader state financial tac-
tics which “have become key mechanisms in disciplining migrant populations" (Coddington;, 2019: 
531; see also Culcasi et al. 2019). Such a view enables drawing attention to modes of violence 
which are not narrowed to blatant human right violations. Relatedly, this perspective significantly 
pushes critical analysis of techno-humanitarianism beyond mechanisms of arbitrary exclusion - 
 In fact, since 2015 Jordan - and in particular the refugee camp of Zaatari - has become the key site for high-tech and 11
financial actors to test technologies for refugees (Turner, 2019; see also Jacobsen, 2017). Plus, as I show later in the 
paper, unlike in Jordan, in Greece the UNHCR did not experiment technologies such as the iris scan.
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such as. migrants excluded from the Cash Assistance Programme - considering how cashless tech-
nologies shape and discipline refugees' subjectivities. However, I suggest that a focus on state logics 
needs to be supplemented with an inquiry of the role played by financial and humanitarian actors 
and nuanced in light of the intertwining of European and national interests .  12
More broadly, an analysis of the effects of destitution allows questioning discourses on refugee em-
powerment through digital technologies, that are widely promoted by migration agencies and the 
UNHCR. In particular, this scholarship challenges the idea according to which technologies are im-
plemented in refugee governmentality in an inclusive way, as it illustrates that asylum seekers are 
discriminated in getting access to the cash assistance or in making purchases. Yet, speaking of desti-
tute asylum seekers means assuming that they have been stripped off, deprived of something, or not 
supported at all or enough by the hosting country, ending up in a state of poverty (Alssopp et al. 
2014) . Instead, here I draw attention to how they had been obstructed and debilitated in their ac13 -
cess to the asylum system and to social rights, without necessarily being unable to meet essential 
living needs or being fully destitute .  14
Relatedly, more than focusing on how asylum seekers have been excluded from digital connectivity 
and cash assistance, I interrogate how their subjectivities are shaped by these technological inter-
mediations with the humanitarian actors. Asylum seekers are disoriented and disempowered in their 
access to both humanitarian and financial support, as well as to rights. o.In order to scrutinise the 
debilitating effects they have on people seeking asylum, cash assistance programmes should be an-
alysed in relation to the other technologies that asylum seekers need to navigate on a daily basis.  In 
Greece, the technological obstacles start for migrants when they decide to claim asylum. Indeed, 
since 2016 migrants who want to book an appointment with the Asylum Office for lodging their 
asylum application need to do this through a mandatory Skype system which for many can be diffi-
cult to handle. Indeed, for some migrants owing a smartphone and getting access to internet is not 
so straightforward and Skype calls can be made only during specific time slots - usually one or two 
 In fact, the Cash Assistance Programme is funded by the European Commission and the Greek authorities do not 12
directly intervene in it. This has generated tensions between the Greek government and the actors involved in the Pro-
gramme, regarding the access to the data collected. At the same time, the EU is pushing the Greek to take over the Pro-
gramme, although this proposal has been postponed many times. 
 As Allsopp and colleagues point out, there is no clear-cut definition of destitution but it is mostly related to the condi13 -
tion of being unable to meet essential living needs.
 While in other contexts, such as the UK, states enact a deliberate politics of refugees destitution, in Greece it is diffi14 -
cult to find out a linear state narrative, due to the role played by actors such as the UNHCR and the EU. Overall, more 
than analysing the cash programme in terms of asylum seekers’ destitution, it is relevant that card beneficiaries com-
plain about the multiple restrictions they encounter in getting access to the financial support and about their own pro-
tracted dependency on humanitarian actors.
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hours per week, depending on migrants' nationalities . As a result of that, “the line is always busy, 15
it took to me three weeks before reaching the Asylum Office” . Since the onset of Covid-19, the 16
asylum procedure has almost entirely switched online:  after pre-booking an appointment via 
Skype, migrants need to lodge their asylum application online, on the website of the Hellenic Min-
istry of Migration and Asylum .  17
Athens, April 23, 2019: at the office of the NGO Caritas around 250 asylum seekers from different 
nationalities are queuing in order to register into the Cash Assistance programme or to do the 
monthly verification to prove they are still eligible for it. As part of that, Caritas’ officers need to 
check the legal status of the card holders and where they are living; the NGO also call asylum seek-
ers over phone, to verify they are still in Greece. However, as one officer stressed to me, “the main 
problem for asylum seekers is technology; what is supposed to facilitate them is actually a main ob-
stacle, from the phone calls, to the compulsory Skype call to book the asylum interview, up to the 
Viber chat system” . For instance, if asylum seekers have technical problems with their prepaid 18
cards, or if the monthly payment is delayed, they can be in touch with humanitarian actors only by 
sending a text via Viber  (See Picture 1). Or better, although an emergency landline exists, this is 19
de facto useless “as it is very unlikely that someone will answer the call, as we are too busy” . Both 20
the Viber number and the landline are connected to an online system, Commoncare, and the opera-
tors from the NGOs that are in charge of answering asylum seekers’ chats do have access both to 
the UNHCR database, Progress, and the one of the financial provider PFS, to check the card trans-
actions in real-time. However, asylum seekers’ personal data, which is contained in Progress, is not 
directly connected to the national hotline: therefore, the operators who store calls and chats need to 
import the data manually from Progress into Commoncare .  21
 According to the data of  the Greek Asylum Office: http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Skype-pro15 -
g r a m m e - 2 8 - 1 - 1 9 -
%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%AF%CE%
B7%CF%83%CE%B7-7.08.2019.pdf
 Interview with an Iranian asylum seeker, Athens, August 2019.16
 https://apps.migration.gov.gr/selfregistration/login?lang=en 17
 Interview with Caritas officers, Athens, April 23, 2019.18
https://www.refugee.info/greece/cash-assistance-in-greece--greece/greece-cash-alliance-hotline 19
 Interview with Caritas, Athens, April 23, 2019.20
 Skype interview with the Hellenic Red Cross, May 2, 2019.21
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According to asylum seekers who experienced the Viber communication system with the NGOs, 
many messages receive a response only after days. This is because the system has been set for send-
ing at the bottom of the queue those card beneficiaries who send multiple messages (See Pictures  1 
2). Even the monthly verification through phone calls often turns out into an obstacle to refugees. 
This is not because they do not have a phone - the huge majority does have one; rather, it is because 
many change their phone number and sim card many times. Thus, instead of claiming that apps like 
WhatsApp empower asylum seekers (Ulrich, Lambert, 2018b) or, on the contrary, fully destitute 
them, it is worth noticing that asylum seekers are repeatedly obstructed - in accessing asylum, rights 
and support - and ultimately disoriented by the frantic changes of deadlines, criteria and procedures. 
The possibility for asylum seekers of using the prepaid cards depends on their ability to deal with 
other technologies - in particular apps, such as Viber and Whatsapp. This happens not only when 
there are technical glitches to be fixed. Rather, technological mediations between asylum seekers 
and humanitarian actors are fully incorporated in the daily operations of refugee governmentality.  
In order to do the monthly verification procedure,  UNHCR and the two NGOs involved in the Pro-
gramme send multiple texts to asylum seekers at different times: the first one is sent to communi-
cate the date of the appointment; the second one, that asylum seekers receive just the day before the 
appointment, indicates the exact time and location. Thus, asylum seekers need to be always reach-
able, plus they must have a mobile phone and not change number, something that often happens. 
What do they received multiple texts deferred in time? This deferred-texts strategy is used for “pre-
venting potential turmoil and disorder"  that might be caused by asylum seekers who come to the 22
registration office outside their slots, or by others who might gather there to get the financial sup-
port even if they are not eligible. In so doing, asylum seekers are preventively disciplined as poten-
tial mobs (Tazzioli, 2017); and, at the same time, they are governed through a multiplicity of scat-
tered temporal deadlines and rules they need to follow. This mix of techno-temporal rules generates 
a widespread disorientation among asylum seekers: indeed, they are entrapped into a whirlwind of 
technological steps to take and they need to pay attention to the unpredictable tiny changes about 
deadlines and eligibility criteria. Even apps - like Whatsapp or Skype - that migrants use on a daily 
basis become actual obstacles to them, together with the multiple disorienting technological steps 
that they need to comply with. 
 Interview with an officer from Caritas, Athens, April 23, 201922
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The fact that asylum seekers are repeatedly disoriented in their attempt to navigate the asylum sys-
tem is a constitutive feature of the way in which technologies are incorporated in refugee govern-
mentality and of how they work. The widespread  disorientation and confusion that asylum seekers 
experience is not just a side effect of the asylum system. ii.As Claudia Aradau has observed “ambi-
guity has also been deployed both to foster non-knowledge and to (de)stabilize the assembling of 
ignorance, uncertainty, and secrecy” (Aradau, 2017: 11). Similarly, modes of governing through 
disorientation are constitutive political technologies of the asylum regime. Asylum seekers’ disori-
entation shows that the non-knowledge enhanced through disorientating compulsory technological 
mediations, unpredictable changes in criteria and deadlines, is not only an epistemic issue but has 
also tangible effects on their lives. Thus, non-knowledge in this case consists in asylum seekers not 
being informed about the changing of rules and of the steps they need to take. For instance, as R. an 
Iranian asylum seeker reported to me in Athens, “I have not received my monthly payment for three 
months, and thus I contacted the landline number I was given by Caritas, and nobody answered; so I 
was told by friends in the camp that I should contact them via Whatsapp, but then this stopped 
working and we could only use Viber. Yet, I realized only after days that you could use those num-
bers only for sending chats, not for making phone calls” .  23
Asylum seekers as forced hindered techno-users need to navigate un-legible techno-humanitarian 
assemblages made of disciplinary rules that are changed over time. The un-legible differs from lack 
of transparency, as it consists in the active production of opacity through repeated changes that asy-
lum seekers are not informed of. Un-legible techno-humanitarian rules consist in the active undoing 
of legibility, that is in the setting up of procedures that remain constantly opaque, mainly because 
they are altered in an unpredictable way and, thus, asylum seekers need to constantly update them-
selves. The reiterated production of un-legible techno-disciplinary rules are constitutive components 
of ways of governing through disorientation. Thus, the “circuits of financial-
humanitarianism” (Tazzioli, 2019) function through a series of dispersed technological steps that 
people seeking asylum need to repeatedly undertake. The production of un-legible technological 
procedures through frantic changes made without letting asylum seekers know is associated with 
the “discrediting of subjects of knowledge” (Aradau, 2017: 10; see also Stel, 2016). Asylum seekers 
as card beneficiaries have to constantly figure out how to navigate technologies, and at the same 
time they are deemed to be deceiving, cheating subjects - who try to circumvent any rule. 
 Interview with R., Iranian asylum seeker in Athens, July 28, 2018.23
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Forced hindered techno-users, beyond victimization and securitisation 
An insight into the role of digital technologies in refugee governmentality enables engaging with 
the transformations that occurred in the securitisation of refugees (Hammerstad, 2011; McCluskey, 
2019; Huysmans, 2000; Squire, Scheel, 2014) and in technologization of security (Bigo, 2002; 
Ceyhan, 2002). This paper complicates  the representation of refugees as risky subjects and subject 
at risk - that is as subjects who are crafted as potential threats and who, alternatively, might be por-
trayed as subjects of pity to be protected (Baker-Beall, 2019; Dijstelbloem, van de Veer, 2019; 
Gray, Franck, 2019). Hoffmann has pointed to the overlapping security claims that underpin and 
justify the implementation of digital technologies in refugee camps (Hoffmann, 2017). Analyses 
about the victimisation of refugees had been rife in the literature (Fassin, 2005; Mallki, 1996) and 
scholars have demonstrated how security and humanitarian modes of intervention are strictly inter-
twined and do mutually reinforce each other. Notably, as Miriam Ticktin has shown, migrants are 
governed through the “regimes of care” that shape them as “subjects of pity, not rights” (Ticktin, 
2011: 61). Aradau has cogently analysed the mutual entanglements between politics of risk and pol-
itics of pity, showing how “risk technologies have made possible the specification of the victim […] 
as inherently and perpetually ‘risky’” (Aradau, 2004: 275). Scholars have explored how the crafting 
of refugees as “risky subjects” and “subjects at risk" is enacted in the daily operations of refugee 
humanitarianism, through twofold political technologies of “care and control” (Isleyen, 2018; Pal-
lister-Wilkins, 2016; Williams, 2015). 
 Katja Lindskov Jacobsen and Larissa Fast have noticed that the use of technology in humanitarian 
governance "blurs control and care, emancipation, and domination”, as long as new technologies 
are tested in refugee camps "on the basis of improvements in care” (Jacobsen, Fast, 2019: 156) 
while at the same time they introduce new modes of control. Yet, security-centered analyses should 
be nuanced in light of asylum seekers being treated mainly as deportable subjects  and, at the same 24
time  transformed into surfaces of data extraction and value production (Amoore, 2020; Aradau, 
Tazzioli, 2020). ,Securitization and victimisation are not exhaustive analytics for grasping the 
modes of subjection, extraction and control that asylum seekers are shaped and affected by. Rather, 
the security-humanitarianism diptych requires to be supplemented with an analysis of how asylum 
 This has been particularly the case since the implementation of the EU-Turkey Deal, in March 2016, which estab24 -
lishes that migrants who land in Greece coming via Turkey can be deported to Turkey.
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seekers are shaped as forced hindered techno-users who are deemed to misuse the refugee system - 
e.g. by claiming asylum to obtain a temporary authorisation to stay.  
In Greece security claims are partly mobilised for justifying and promoting the use of prepaid cards 
and digital technologies in refugee camps and hotspots: the card distribution is indeed supposed to 
enhance asylum seekers’ security - avoiding identity fraud and fights among them - and to prevent 
potential tumults, as long as humanitarian distribution can be done in a smoother and less arbitrary 
way, by increasing the distance between asylum seekers and humanitarian actors. Actually, asylum 
seekers in the hotspots are partly governed by the interweaving of logics of care and control on a 
daily basis. The implementation of digital and financial technologies in refugee camps and hotspots 
takes place in a securitised space, in particular on the Greek islands where many migrants are en-
trapped, due to the EU-Turkey Deal. Within such a context, witnessing to asylum seekers who go in 
and out the Moria Hotspot in Lesvos  surrounded by fences with the prepaid cards in their hands 25
shed lights on the carceral economy in with cash assistance and digital technologies at large are im-
plemented as, ultimately, “free services are delivered to an incarcerated population” (Hoffman, 
2017: 11; see also Martin, 2020). And yet, it is worth noticing that hotspots have become sites of 
protracted vulnerability and into unsafe spaces for refugees, also due to the lack of adequate med-
ical support (Sozer, 2019; Vradis et al. 2019). In fact, digital technologies are not (mainly) used in 
refugee humanitarianism for enacting pervasive surveillance and capillary control of asylum seek-
ers . In Greece, asylum seekers are not object of constant monitoring and, rather, they tend to be 26
overlooked by state authorities that often do not provide care and basic humanitarian support.  
Therefore, security, in its multiple forms - as state security as well as refugee security - does not ap-
pear as the main concern or justification mobilised by state authorities. First, in Greece, the political 
and social reaction to the increasing presence of women, men and children seeking asylum needs to 
be critically read jointly with and in light of the austerity measures that Greek citizens have been 
affected by: the temporal conjuncture in 2015 of the economic crisis and of the so called “refugee 
crisis” transformed the latter into a bench test for Greece (Spathopoulou, Carastathis, 2020). Indeed, 
the political pressure that the European Commission had put on Greece regarding migrants’ identi-
fication and hosting procedures in the hotspots contributed to turn asylum seekers into  irseconomic 
and social burdens. In addition to that, it is worth noticing that citizens’ perception of people seek-
 The information that I report here concerns the situation on the island of Lesvos before that the Hotspot was set on 25
fire (September 2020) and that the new camp opened.
 This does not mean that asylum seekers are not controlled; rather, it is a question of studying the modes in which 26
control is enacted, beyond surveillance, and how it is intertwined with modes of governing through disregard.
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ing asylum has changed in the country since 2015. While  in 2015 migrants were in transit towards 
other EU countries, with the closure of the Balkan route in 2016 their protracted presence in Greece 
appeared as a burden to cope with  - indeed, many remained stranded on the Greek islands or gave 
up their goal of reaching other European countries and claimed asylum in Greece.   
Second, at the same time that asylum seekers are victimized as subjects of pity or criminalized and 
turned into object of suspicion, they are also addressed and blamed as kept people, dependent on 
NGOs and state aid. “NGOs are pampering refugees” , the Greek government significantly de27 -
clared in 2020, as part of a campaign apt at discrediting both asylum seekers and nongovernmental 
organisations.  Hence, on the one hand, asylum seekers appear as economic and social burdens, and 
are depicted as parasite of the welfare system and of humanitarian aid; on the other, they are actual-
ly turned into nd forced hindered techno-users and requested to perform a series of technological 
tasks and getting by with deadlines and changes in criteria in order to get access to financial and 
humanitarian support. That is, at the same time that asylum seekers are blamed for being pampered 
by and dependent on humanitarian and state aid, they are also forced to use technological media-
tions. 
 Asylum seekers, who are constrained by multiple spatial and temporal restrictions as forced techno-
users, hustle for dodging some of these obstacles (Thieme, 2017). For instance, due to technical 
glitches in the database, some card beneficiaries managed to get the monthly financial support 
twice, moving from one camp to another when the monthly top up was taking place, or by taking 
the prepaid cards of friends who left the country .  As S., an Afghan national stranded in the hot28 -
spot of Moria told me, “the amount we receive every month is so minimal that barely manage to 
cope with essential needs, as to get the food in the camp we have to queue for hours, so many of us 
prefer to buy it, and most of the time it's not enough or it's always the same; therefore, some people 
found ways of getting more money”. Therefore, asylum seekers are turned into forced hindered 
techno-users who need to handle things and who are rendered more precarious and are  debilitated 
as long as their access to financial and humanitarian support is obstructed - by the multiple and con-
fusing techno-bureaucratic steps they need to take.  
 According to the Greek migration ministry’s secretary general, Manos Logothetis “these are people who have gained 27
refugee status and should be fending for themselves […] If they are pampered, how are they going to ever find a job 
and become part of society, s” (https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jun/25/we-want-to-stay-
refugees-struggle-to-integrate-in-greece-after-camp-life ).
 This was the case in 2017, when the UNHCR did not have a centralised database, so it was easier for asylum seekers 28
to dodge the system. 
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The forced technological mediations between humanitarian actors on the one side, and asylum 
seekers on the other, enhance the multiple hurdles that these latter encounter in receiving protection, 
humanitarian support and cash assistance. How are asylum seekers affected by that? What are the 
effects on their subjectivities? These compulsory technological steps in conjunction with deadlines 
and unpredictable changes in the rules and criteria that generate a widespread disorientation on 
people seeking asylum which disempower them.  
That is, asylum seekers are disoriented and disempowered in their access to both humanitarian and 
financial support, as well as to rights. Hence, the multiple technological obstructions that asylum 
seekers deal with end up in debilitating them, as Jasbir Puar has fleshed out in her analysis of modes 
of governing by harming populations (Puar, 2017). In fact, asylum seekers are confronted with both 
material obstacles – such as the need of downloading and using certain apps – and with a series of 
technological steps to take whose rules change frequently over time. In so doing, the compulsory 
technological mediations of refugee humanitarianism and the changing criteria associated to those, 
disorient asylum seekers who, as a result, might end up in missing a deadline, or doing the proce-
dure in a wrong way. The turning of asylum seekers into hindered forced techno-users sheds light 
on modes of governing which do not craft migrants exclusively as potential threats as dangerous 
individuals nor as subjects in need of protection: more than being totally deprived they are insecuri-
tized by being kept into a condition of uncertainty and obstructed from accessing both asylum and 
humanitarian support. 
Reinforcing dependence: 
Asylum seekers are often entrapped in a suspended life: the protracted waiting time of the asylum 
procedure and the deep uncertainty about the future keep them in a legal limbo (Hyndman, Giles, 
2011). However, this protected waiting time is far from being empty: asylum seekers are obliged to 
take multiple technological steps, comply with changing deadlines and understand how the asylum 
system work. In some cases, such as the Skype call system to book an appointment with the Asylum 
Office, technological steps are mandatory for entering the asylum procedure. In some others, tech-
nological intermediations are not compulsory but they are the only way for communicating with 
humanitarian actors - such as the use of Viber to report technical problems with the prepaid card. 
Which relationships between asylum seekers as forced techno-users and humanitarian actors is pro-
duced?  
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The fact that asylum seekers are given prepaid cards and are requested to use technology for navi-
gating the “asylum’s minefield”  should not lead us to conclude that they are turned into rs ordi29 -
nary consumers  or neoliberal self-managing subjects. On the contrary, asylum seekers are expected 
to act as responsible techno-users and yet, at the same time, they are object of multiple spatial re-
strictions and are entrapped in precarious legal conditions, and many of them might quickly become 
deportable .  A salient example is provided by the increasing use of the app Viber for communicat30 -
ing with asylum seekers. If initially the app was used only by UNHCR as part of the Cash As-
sistance Programme, after the onset of Covid-19 it had been adopted by the Greek authorities for 
updating asylum seekers. In particular, Viber has become the main communicative channel between 
Greek authorities and asylum seekers on the Greek islands: after that the hotspot in Lesvos was set 
on fire on September 8, 2020, the Greek Ministry of Migration and Asylum launched “Migration 
Greece Info” , a Viber community for sending info and updates about asylum-related matters . 31 32
The community chat has also been used for warning asylum seekers from being in touch with 
NGOs and blackmailing those who refuse to enter the new camp in Lesvos: “the Greek state guar-
antees your security. Do not believe anyone else. Your life is safe only in the new camp […] From 
today on, water and food supplies will only be available inside the camp” . 
33
Overall, reading the few chats sent every week to the asylum seekers, more than for facilitating ac-
cess to humanitarian services, the Viber community is used for intimidating asylum seekers or 
communicating important new rules and restrictions, that will remain unknown to those unable to 
download and navigate the app. The digitalisation of asylum procedures has been further enhanced 
in 2020, when the Greek authorities implemented a pilot project on the island of Lesvos for con-
ducting asylum interviews remotely: as it has been documented by Greek NGOs, as part of the on-
line asylum system, asylum seekers receive the date of their interview via text only the day before; 
during the interview, due to poor internet connectivity, asylum seekers need to repeat their sen-
 As E. a lawyer of the NGO HIAS defined the Greek asylum system during our conversation (August 24, 2020).29
 This is the case of those whose application for the international protection is rejected.30
 https://invite.viber.com/?g2=AQBwbnVKr3AUHUv7i1F8blVpQ6t6fqUHHHqTaIVCMvoPy3ty6b4DM6Lio%2Bry31 -
aTS0&lang=en 
 Such as, among others, exceptional closures of the Asylum Office, logistical information which concerns the new 32
temporary refugee camp in Lesvos, spatial restrictions imposed on asylum seekers and IOM’s voluntary return pro-
grammes.
 Viber chat sent to the asylum seekers in Lesvos on September 29, 2020. 33
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tences multiple times, and their personal data is not “safeguarded through the questionable platform 
that is used to conduct the remote interviews” . 34
The temporary incorporation into financial circuits does not transform them into bank clients nor 
into ordinary customers. This emerges also from the functioning of the Cash Assistance Pro-
gramme. Indeed, the prepaid cards are not associated with individual bank accounts but with the 
unique UNHCR's financial wallet, and therefore they cannot save their own money or keep an ac-
count when they are no longer eligible for the monthly financial support. Relatedly, when they use 
the prepaid cards, there are few restrictions on purchases (for instance, alcohol as well as online 
payments, which automatically block the cards). Therefore, more than being turned into consumers, 
asylum seekers as card beneficiaries become para-consumers and forced hindered techno-users. 
Taking into account the use of digital technologies in the field of humanitarianism, UNHCR’s pro-
grammes to enhance refugees’ resilience and entrepreneurship, a growing scholarship has pointed to 
the affirmation of “humanitarianism as a neoliberal diagnostic” (Reid-Henry, 2014) predicated upon 
refugees’ self-reliance and autonomy (Betts, Collier, 2017; Easton-Calabria, Omata, 2018; Ilcan, 
Rygiel, 2015). The partial turn in humanitarian narratives from refugees being portrayed as victims 
or as subjects to protect towards refugees as self-reliant individuals draws the attention to how they 
“can (and thus implicitly should) adapt to their new circumstances, rather than facilitating demands 
for human rights, political change, and humanitarian support” (Turner, 2019:3). These analyses cap-
ture important features and transformations that have been at play in the discourses, and in the ra-
tionale of refugee humanitarianism. Nevertheless, the stress on refugees' self-reliance ends up in 
representing asylum seekers as consumers overshadows the way in which techno-humanitarianism 
reinforces asylum seekers’ dependency on humanitarian actors and how asylum seekers as techno-
users are hampered from getting asylum. 
Yet, speaking of protracted dependency on humanitarian actors does not mean s that asylum seekers 
are  just entrapped in a state of indefinite wait. Rather, as forced hindered techno-users asylum 
seekers are requested to comply with a series of techno-bureaucratic steps and to keep themselves 
up to date about the unpredictable changes of criteria and deadlines. Jointly, they are object of a 
moral injunction, as they are expected to act as responsible consumers and techno-users from within 
a condition of spatial incarceration (on the islands) or by dealing with multiple  spatial and social 
restrictions (on the mainland). The hectic techno-bureaucratic activities that asylum seekers need to 
 Report of Legal Organizations on the quality of remote asylum interviews at RAO Lesvos and the conditions they are 34
conducted under, which pose a health risk to asylum seekers and employees 
https://rsaegean.org/en/report-of-legal-organizations-on-the-quality-of-remote-asylum-interviews-at-rao-lesvos/?
fbclid=IwAR1KI--Fxsyf1tcT2jLuYfcnKAblgWQoA-10oPX6BuPM-nqjMnGmu7nNUJs 
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perform strengthen the dependency on humanitarian actors and, at the same time, generate disorien-
tation on migrants themselves. However, this reiterated dependency should not be confused with 
humanitarian support as such: in fact, asylum seekers in Greece are expected to deal with multiple 
technological intermediations used for communicating with humanitarian actors while, at the same 
time, they often lack of medical, psychological and legal aid in hotspots and refugee camps (MSF, 
2018). 
The Cash Assistance scheme is promoted by  UNHCR as a financial-humanitarian measure with the 
ambivalent goal of alleviating asylum seekers’ economic precarity, and enhancing refugee’s dignity 
and freedom of choice. More precisely, it is noteworthy that these two levels of intervention are 
merged one into the other, as long as fostering dignity is equated with enabling asylum seekers to 
get by: “cash assistance”, according to UNHCR, “restores dignity and empowers asylum-seekers 
and refugees who can now choose how to cover their basic needs” (UNHCR, 2020). Indeed, as 
UNHCR officers in Athens and in Lesvos  stressed to me “the cash assistance is a minimal finan35 -
cial support which allows asylum seekers to get by, but at the same time it also enables them to 
choose how to best use their money”.  
Yet, asylum seekers are not depicted as self-entrepreneurs nor as fully autonomous subjects. In fact, 
the European Commission envisages the Cash Assistance Programme as a modality "for affected 
populations to meet their basic needs with choice and dignity” (ECHO, 2019: 11); in other words, 
claims to autonomy and freedom of choice are quite cautiously introduced within the vocabulary of 
basic needs and survival. Through the Cash Assistance Programme, asylum seekers have not been 
portrayed as entrepreneurs of themselves: as forced hindered techno-users, they are expected to use 
the cards in a responsible way being aware that this support will only last temporarily and that the 
next month it might not be renewed: “asylum seekers wrongly see the Cash Assistance as something 
which is due to them, as a right” a UNHCR officer in Lesvos told me “but actually we repeatedly 
tell them that financial support is something they should not take for granted; it is a measure that we 
don’t know for how long it will last, and eligibility criteria might change over time”. That is, as 
Lauren Martin has remarked, asylum seekers as forced techno-users and card beneficiaries are "fig-
ured as particular kinds of economic subjects: benefit seeking, persuadable, but most certainly not 
potential workers or neoliberal entrepreneurial subjects” (Martin, 2020: 13). 
  Interviews conducted with UNHCR officers in Athens (April 2018 and July 2019) and Lesvos (January and July 35
2019).
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In particular, Greek context leads us to complicate the widespread discourse on asylum seekers as 
entrepreneurs and self-reliant subjects: indeed, in Greece asylum seekers are requested to act as re-
sponsible techno-users and, at the same time, to abide to a panoply of spatial restrictions, temporal 
constraints and disciplinary rules. By providing them prepaid cards in Greece, refugees “become 
more self-sufficient and are supported to take responsibility for their lives” , a EU promotional 36
video states.  This emerges quite clearly from the “Evaluation of the effects of cash based interven-
tions on protection outcomes in Greece” in which the UNHCR argues that the main goals of the 
Cash Assistance Programme are “to increase Persons of Concern (PoCs) access to basic needs and 
reduce their use of negative coping strategies” (UNHCR, 2018: 33). In this evaluation report, UN-
HCR admits the various problems and limits of the Cash Assistance in enhancing refugees’ auton-
omy. This is firstly because those who receive a regular income are ineligible for the Cash As-
sistance and this is “a key factor which may affect the potential […] to facilitate PoCs engagement 
in livelihoods activities towards self-reliance” (UNHCR, 2018: 7). Secondly, the Cash Assistance as 
a coping mechanism does not facilitate the integration of refugees in the national labour market due 
to the high rate of unemployment in the country.  
At a close glance, even the main goal set by the UNHCR of using the prepaid cards for coping with 
asylum seekers basic needs - such as food and clothes - is considered only partially reached: accord-
ing to the post-distribution survey, “the majority of respondents reported spending more than the 
value of their MPG, which indicates that the MPG transfer value may not be sufficient to fully 
cover PoCs basic needs” (UNHCR, 2018: 6). In other words, the Cash Assistance is promoted as a 
mechanism that while on the one hand is expected to restore dignity and autonomy to the stranded 
migrants, on the other, it is illustrated by UNHCR as a system for assisting asylum seekers in cop-
ing with basic needs and by partially even failing that target. Therefore, asylum seekers in Greece 
are object of a moral injunction to act as responsible techno-users and consumers while, at the same 
time, they are expected and requested to comply with a panoply of technological steps, para-legal 
obligations and spatial restrictions. Disciplinary and coerced modes of governing are indeed entan-
gled with neoliberal injunction to empowerment and autonomy (Ong, 2006). 
https://ec.europa.eu/echo/field-blogs/videos/5-things-you-need-know-about-cash-assistance-refugees-and-asylum-36
seekers-greece_en 
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Conclusion: 
With the outbreak of COVID-19, Greece has suspended the asylum applications for one month  37
and asylum seekers had been subject to further mobility restrictions that also affect them as card 
beneficiaries. Indeed, at the end of March 2020 the Cash Assistance had been suspended on the is-
lands for few weeks "to prevent people from going into nearby towns and villages and creating 
queues” (RRE, 2020: 5). At the same time, until September 3, 2020 asylum seekers on the islands 
were not allowed to leave the hotspot-area. In May, an ATM machine was installed outside the 
hotspots of Lesvos and Samos, and, as confirmed by NGOs , asylum seekers’ prepaid cards had 38
been reset for taking cash only from that machine, and to do that during specific time slots. The fi-
nancial provider PFS has defined this possibility of switching on and off the functioning of prepaid 
cards as a “good and fair way of controlling refugees” . Thus, both access to cash and to mobility 39
have been increasingly disrupted, also through the mediation of technology , and asylum seekers’ 40
dependency on humanitarian and financial actors.  
Thus, scholars have stressed the ambivalent role of digital technologies in refugee governance, 
showing how they are used by states and non-state actors to control asylum seekers and how, at the 
same time, they also empower migrants. This piece has reformulated analyses on “control and em-
powerment” (Nedelcu, Soysuren, 2020) by gesturing towards an understanding of how forced tech-
nological mediations rather obstruct asylum seekers who are thus debilitated and disoriented in their 
attempt to get humanitarian support and protection. Hence, the multiple technological steps that 
asylum seekers need to navigate enhance the socio-legal precarity of people seeking asylum, byt 
hampering them from getting financial and humanitarian support and from accessing the channels 
of  asylum. As part of that, asylum seekers who are turned into forced techno-users also need to 
keep themselves up to date about the frantic changes of disciplinary rules and bureaucratic steps 
they need to take. A focus on techno-humanitarianism leads us to complicate the representation of 
asylum seekers as either subjects to protect or security threats and, consequently, leads us to ques-
tion victimisation and securitization as overwhelming analytical grids for addressing how they are 
 This happened in April 2020, after that the Greek authorities suspended the asylum applications in March, as a deter37 -
rence measure against migrants who entered Greece via the Turkish land border.
 Skype interview with Caritas, June 8 2020. The information has been reported also by the NGO Happy 38
F a m i l y , b a s e d i n L e s v o s : h t t p s : / / o h f - l e s v o s . o r g / ?
mailpoet_router&endpoint=view_in_browser&action=view&data=WzE0NiwiOWVmZTRkZGZiNWE4Ii-
wwLDAsMTI1LDFd 
 Skype interview with PFS, June 25, 2020. 39
 The prepaid cards reset in a way that enables asylum seekers to take cash only from specific ATM machines40
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subjectivised. In fact, asylum seekers are not only controlled or victimised: they are crafted as 
forced hindered techno-users, who need to keep themselves up to date with compulsory technologi-
cal steps, and they are targeted by the moral injunction to act as responsible para-consumers. 
Building on that, the paper has shown the pitfalls of neoliberal narratives that depict refugees as en-
trepreneurs of themselves: on the contrary, their dependence on humanitarian actors is reinforced 
along the lines of a peculiar assemblage between disciplinary rules, compulsory technologies and a 
moral injunction to be responsible techno-users and consumers. For this reason, it is important to 
situate a critical analysis of techno-humanitarianism within the exclusionary legal and political ar-
chitecture of the EU’s asylum regime. Asylum seekers are shaped and targeted by ambivalent 
claims and political technologies: they are expected to act as responsible consumers being at the 
same time constrained and stranded. Thus,  how to formulate a critical analysis of techno-humani-
tarianism not narrowed to control and surveillance nor to refugees' empowerment through technolo-
gies ?  How shall we come to grips with the enhanced precarity of asylum seekers who are obstruct-
ed from accessing rights and financial support? These questions might be at the core of a research 
agenda on the political economy of techno-humanitarianism that this paper hints at. This would in-
volve investigate the “new processes of data extraction” (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2019: 146) and the 
ways in which  asylum seekers as forced hindered techno-users are hampered and might be legally 
destitute and, yet, they are anyway source of value production.de 
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